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Abstract
The object of analysis in the present text is the issue of surveillance and data retention
in Poland. The analysis of this issue follows from a critical stance taken by NGOs and
state institutions on the scope of operational control wielded by the Polish police and
special services – it concerns, in particular, the employment of “itemised phone bills
and phone tapping.”
Besides the quantitative analysis of surveillance and the scope of data retention, the text
features the conclusions of the Human Rights Defender referred to the Constitutional Tri-
bunal in 2011. It must be noted that the main problems concerned with the employment of
surveillance and data retention are caused by: (1) a lack of specification of technical
means which can be used by individual services; (2) a lack of specification of what kind of
information and evidence is in question; (3) an open catalogue of information and evi-
dence which can be clandestinely acquired in an operational mode. Furthermore, with re-
gard to the access granted to teleinformation data by the Telecommunications Act,
attention should be drawn to the wide array of data submitted to particular services.
Also, the text draws on open interviews conducted mainly with former police officers
with a view to highlighting some non-formal reasons for “phone tapping” in Poland.
This comes in the form of a summary.
Key words: operational control, data retention, teleinformation data, police, secret
services, phone tapping, civil liberties
1. Introduction
In 2010 the police and other competent authorities made over 6,700 re-
quests for surveillance. Only in 4% of all the cases did courts and prosecu-
tors not order the monitoring or recording of conversations (courts refused
in 0.7% of cases and the prosecutor’s office in 3.2% of cases).1 It means
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1 Calculations are based on the 2011 Chief Prosecutor’s report. Percentage values
are expressed to the second digit after the decimal place.
that only very few requests by individual institutions were not granted per-
mission. 2011 saw an increase of over 1,000 requests for surveillance. It
must be noted that quantitative data on tapping apply to trial cases, namely
those cases where the acquired information can be submitted as evidence
(with the intention of detecting and preventing crime). Apart from wire-
tapping, itemised telephone bills and text message records are also used.
The European Commission, in its 2011 report evaluating the Directive on
the retention of telecommunications data, indicated that, statistically, Po-
land comes first in terms of requests for telephone users’ traffic data [9].
According to the information 14 member states submitted to the Euro-
pean Commission, Poland’s activity amounted to 51% of all data retention
requests in 2009. By contrast, France accounts for 25%, the Czech Repub-
lic for 13.6%, Lithuania for 3.5% and Spain for 3.4%. A significant num-
ber of requests in Poland can only partially be explained by the fact that
the relevant authorities need to submit identical requests to each of the
main mobile telephone operators.2
In 2012, however, all the authorities requested surveillance on 4,206
people (encompassing wire tapping, SMSes and MMSes). About 80% of
requests received by the prosecutor’s office were submitted by the police
[7]. A drop in the number of requests can be attributed to some changes in
the Code of Penal Procedure and the Police Force Act, which tightened
prosecutor supervision over the operational techniques used by law en-
forcement services. Even so, it needs to be noticed that the ability to abuse
law has not disappeared. This is connected with the list of offences
whereby phone tapping and recording is enforceable (e.g. it is often
claimed that other methods to combat organised crime groups have proved
ineffective).
It is notable that in Poland there are 11 institutions with the power to
wiretap citizens, which is unparalleled, not only on the European scale. It
may also speak volumes about how policy-makers decide to develop con-
trol mechanisms and attempt to reduce the inefficiency of the state’s struc-
tures and individual institutions by vesting special powers in them. The
problem is that those special powers significantly affect citizens’ rights.
Moreover, the Polish foundation Panoptykon stresses that existing legisla-
tion on the availability of telecommunications data is used to circumvent
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2 The calculation is based on data provided by the European Commission. Per-
centage values are expressed to the second digit after the decimal place.
regulations on professional privileges – confidentiality of journalistic
sources in particular [2]. Another problem is that some services refer to
itemised phone bills in order to indicate perpetrators, which stems from
the fact that, unlike in the case of wiretapping, a request for an itemised
telephone bill is not subject to restrictions, whereby an offence has to be
detected [14]. The abuse of the legislation is well exemplified in the case
of B. Wróblewski (a journalist for the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wy-
borcza) versus the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. In a civil trial the
Warsaw Court of Appeal ruled that the Bureau illegally checked his phone
records in 2007 and found it guilty of infringing Mr. Wróblewski’s per-
sonal interests, his right to privacy and freedom to establish contacts [6].
According to Panoptykon’s data from 2011, state institutions issued
over 1.85 million information requests concerning citizens’ telecommuni-
cations contacts. This is up by about 500,000 compared with last year and
by about 800,000 compared with 2009. This fact met with a reaction from
Human Rights Defender, who drew the government’s attention to the
problem of disclosing wiretaps and phone records. In 2011, Human Right
Defender twice made a request to the Constitutional Tribunal for a confor-
mity check with the existing legislature. In 2013, the Constitutional Tribu-
nal received from the Supreme Audit Office a report on the extent to which
phone records data is acquired and processed. The Supreme Audit Office
bluntly stated that current legislation does not protect citizens’ rights and
liberties sufficiently.
2. Human Rights Defender’s requests to the Constitutional
Tribunal in 2011
On the 29th July, 2011, Human Rights Defender filed with the Supreme
Court a request to deem Article 19 Paragraph 6 Subparagraph 3 of the Po-
lice Force Act unconstitutional [10] (as well as its equivalent regulations
in the Border Guard Act, Military Police Act, State Protection Office Act,
Intelligence Agency Act, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau Act, Military
Counterespionage Service Act and Military Espionage Service Act) [13].
The problem concerned the employment of technical devices enabling, by
covert means, the acquisition and recording of information and evidence,
in particular phone conversations registered by telecommunications net-
works (Article 19 Paragraph 6 Subparagraph 3 of the Police Force Act).
What proved to be the main problem was the imprecision of the regula-
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tion, which allowed some leeway for the authorities to use unspecified
technical devices (e.g. GPS navigation systems). According to Human
Rights Defender, the problem lay not in the wide extent to which the de-
vices were used, but the fact that they served the purpose of obtaining
unspecified information about citizens. Moreover, there was a lack of con-
trol, as the activities of individual authorities under the contested provision
corresponded to operational activities, hence they were not considered
procedural activities [13, pp. 2-4].
Under the then law on surveillance (nonprocedural proceedings) [13,
p. 7]3 all technical devices which enabled the acquisition and recording of
data and evidence were allowed. Human Rights Defender claimed that the
problem lay in imprecisely outlining the following items:
1) technical devices that the services were permitted to use,
2) the information and evidence in question,
3) list of information and evidence that could be covertly acquired during
operational procedures [13, pp. 5-6].
In this context, Human Rights Defender indicated that the following
regulations enshrined in the Constitution of Poland might be being
breached: Article 31 (the scope of constraints on constitutional rights and
liberties), Article 47 (inter alia legal protection of privacy), Article 49
(freedom of communication and protection of its confidentiality), Article
50 (inviolability of domicile), Article 51 (an individual’s right to disclose
information), Article 52 (freedom of movement). Moreover, the powers
exercised by border guards, fiscal controllers and the military police could
result in a far-reaching encroachment on the image rights of an individual.
On the 1st August, 2011, Human Rights Defender filed another request
with the Constitutional Tribunal; this time it regarded the access that indi-
vidual authorities had to telecommunications data. The request intended to
verify the unconstitutionality of Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Police Force
Act [4] as well as its equivalent regulations in the Border Customs Act,
Military Police Act, Fiscal Control Act, State Protection Office Act, Intel-
ligence Agency Act, Military Counterespionage Service Act and Military
Espionage Service Act. This constitutionality was determined by the pow-
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3 Under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms the right to respect for correspondence can be constrained if it is in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the coun-
try, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
ers established in communications law, precisely in Article 180c and Arti-
cle 180d on data collection [11].
Defender’s position was determined by Article 159 Paragraph 1 of the
Telecommunications Act which introduced the term ‘confidentiality of
communication’, encompassing: user data, content of communications,
traffic data (including location data), location data that goes beyond the
data necessary for the transmission of a communication or billing, data
about attempts at establishing a connection between network termina-
tions. The relatively wide term ‘data’ encompassed not only the content
but also the user’s data and location data [12]. Any encroachment on the
confidentiality of communication needs to be justified and clearly speci-
fied (vide Article 31 of the Constitution of Poland), otherwise Article 49
of the Constitution of Poland (freedom of communication and protection
of its confidentiality) and Article 8 Paragraph 1 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the right to re-
spect of the confidentiality of correspondence) would both be infringed.4
Article 159 Paragraph 2 of the Telecommunications Act stipulated that it
was forbidden for anyone but the sender and the receiver to access, record,
store, export or use protected content in any manner or data, unless 1) it was
the subject of the service or it was necessary to provide the service; 2) the
sender or the receiver of the data consented to it; 3) those activities were
necessary in order to register the communications and the related traffic data
when carried out in the course of lawful business practice for the purpose of
providing evidence of a commercial transaction or of any other business
communication; 4) it was necessary for different purposes stipulated in the
Act or in separate provisions. Furthermore, Article 159 Paragraph 3 stated
that disclosing and processing confidential content or data, other than those
provided for in the Act, was tantamount to breaching confidentiality [11] [12].
According to Human Rights Defender, it was not the regulations of the
Telecommunications Act that posed the problem, but the nature of surveil-
lance i.e. their subsidiarity and confidentiality. Moreover, the checks were
to be applied to precisely defined offences, and any materials obtained by
those means needed to be destroyed when proved useless (Article 19 of
Police Force Act). However, under Article 20c Paragraph 1 of the Police
Force Act in order to prevent or detect offences, the police could provide
telecommunications data which could then be processed [10; 12, pp. 5-6].
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4 This refers to the data specified in Article180c and 180d of the Telecommunica-
tions Act (Journal of Laws No. 171, item 1800 with amendments).
Under Article 180d of the Telecommunications Act, should the com-
petent services request it, telecommunications companies were under the
obligation of ensuring conditions for data access and recording, as well as
the availability of the processed data (at their own cost) related to the tele-
communications service provided and mentioned in Article 159 Para-
graph 1 Subparagraph 1 and 3-5, in Article 161 Paragraph 9. Therefore, it
needed to be noticed that individual authorities could access, among other
things, traffic data and location data and data such as names, surnames,
parents’ names, date and place of birth, address, personal identification
number, number and series of ID and information confirming the perfor-
mance of the obligation towards the provider of telecommunications ser-
vices. Moreover, the competent authorities could obtain different data: tax
identification number, address, bank account number, email address and
phone contact list with phone numbers.
Undoubtedly, the list of data made available for specified authorities was
long. By the same token, the list of offences which constituted the legal ba-
sis for a disclosure request was equally long. The non-exhaustive list made
it possible to circumvent certain constraints on information access con-
nected with the principle of professional secrecy, such as journalistic con-
fidentiality and legal or medical professional privilege. In addition,
Articles 180c and 180d of the Telecommunications Act did not embrace
the principle of subsidiarity, which meant that the telecommunications op-
erator had to provide data not only in essential cases. In this context, the
competent authorities did not have to seek the court’s permission to access
data protected by the confidentiality of communications regulations [12,
pp. 12-13].
It could not be argued that the regulations in question facilitated the
work of particular authorities, which also could not serve as an argument
in a democratic state, governed by the rule of law (cf. Article 31, Para-
graph 5 and Article 51 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Poland). Legisla-
tion on citizens’ data collection which provided neither clear deadlines
for the deletion of the data gathered, nor stipulated a clear purpose for
storing it (in the case of the State Protection Office Act, Intelligence
Agency Act, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau Act, Military Counterespi-




5 In 2012 the Supreme Audit Office presented information on the control outcome
entitled Recruitment, Selection Procedure and Training of Newly-Employed Officials
As regards the provisions in the Telecommunications Act (Article
180c and 180d inter alia) the Supreme Audit Office also voiced its con-
cern, saying that the purpose of data retention needed to be specified be-
cause invoking the need to prevent and detect crimes was too general.
The Supreme Audit Office, similarly to the Constitutional Tribunal,
called for implementing the principal of subsidiarity – regulations which
would allow the use of telecommunications data subject to the inability
to use other means of control. Moreover, the Supreme Audit Office
pointed out that there were no constraints as to the people targeted by
data retention. De facto, it meant that those regulations clashed with
safeguard principles such as professional privilege (e.g. legal or medi-
cal) [4].
3. Non-formal reasons behind telephone tapping in Poland
6
Crime investigation is a significant element of police work which is in-
tended to influence legal proceedings at a further stage. It needs to be
stated that the quality of reconnaissance operations has decreased, which
translates into the low efficiency of police investigation units.
The lower quality of operational and investigative work needs to be
attributed to a poor training system, lower work standards, and insuffi-
cient control of superior police units over various local units [1] [3]. Poor
performance on operational and investigative levels is connected with
the misuse of basic investigation tools, e.g. preservation of evidence. It
needs to be stated that police units, and the Central Bureau of Investiga-
tion on the regional level, hardly ever preserve evidence during the ex-
amination of a crime scene. Another problem is the poor performance of
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of the Internal Security Agency, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Police and Border
Guards [2]. The conclusions by the Supreme Audit Office are limited to the oversight
of the recruitment and training system; therefore, they do not include the issues indi-
cated in the in-depths interviews. The same limitation can be observed in case of 2012
Supreme Audit Office’s report on The Functioning of Schools and Training Centres in
the Police, National Fire Brigades and Border Guard [1].
6 Based on in-depth interviews with former police officers (interviews were car-
ried out in 2012). In 2013 the interview was conducted again, this time, however, with
former police officers who found employment in the private sector (entities ensuring
security of persons and property).
operational and investigation departments regarding sourcing proper
comparative materials. The overall negligence affecting evidence and
investigation results in numerous case dismissals where the accused is
acquitted.
All the outlined problems have an effect on the policy of information
gathering using ICT. It manifests itself in the excessive collection of sus-
pects’ phone records and resorting to surveillance tools such as wiretaps.
The fact that Poland lacks actual control of superior police units, or the ab-
sence of interest in the matter, has led to a situation in which officers
gather a significant amount of data about subscribers. This data, gathered
for 2-4 years, is largely left unanalysed, as there is no technical possibility
to process it into procedural material. As a result, volumes of case files
mainly deal with phone records materials and wiretap materials and barely
address the substance of cases.
This results in a situation where data on a subscriber’s identity, his/her
phone records, etc. is pointlessly and massively collected in operational
case files until the case is closed. When the data is collected by the police,
this situation may actually result in breaching Article 20c Paragraph 7 of
the Police Force Act. In police jargon, this way of carrying out operations
and investigations is referred to as a ‘desk job’. Drawing on wiretaps and
phone records grew to be a working method because of:
1) officers’ poor competence,
2) low efficiency of operational and investigative work,
3) officers’ ineptitude in recruiting informants.
The appraisal of officers’ work is also shaped by what could be de-
scribed as “the department’s low level of work culture.” Additionally,
police officers are particularly motivated to use wiretaps and itemised
telephone bills as they have to produce monthly, quarterly, six-monthly or
yearly reports on the extent to which phone records, wiretaps or other
means of operational work are used. The reports are assessed on a quanti-
tative rather than qualitative basis, i.e. less importance is placed on its pur-
pose and end result.
Despite all this, it needs to be stressed that the materials acquired in
data retention enable the verification of other evidence. Data of this type
facilitates verifying the whereabouts and alibi of a given person, or com-
bating crimes committed over the phone or the internet. The Polish exam-
ple, nevertheless, is one of abuse of wiretaps and phone records by the
police and other authorities.
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4. Abuse of telephone tapping
7
Article 19 Paragraph 1 Subparagraphs 1-8 of the Police Force Act out-
lines cases in which police may resort to surveillance on a suspect [10]. In
most cases, the checks are exercised by other authorities e.g. Central Bu-
reau of Investigation, State Protection Office, Intelligence Agency and
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (the regulation thereof). In the case of
Regional Police Headquarters and individual field offices of the Central
Bureau of Investigation, it needs to be noticed that to use this operational
strategy the authorities embark on operations with the premise of ‘organ-
ised crime’ i.e. they presuppose that they are dealing with this specific
crime. This assumption is often routinely made so as to be given permis-
sion to use wiretapping. This can be exemplified by the activities of Cen-
tral Anti-Corruption Bureau in 2007. It requested a warrant to wiretap
three people (J. Netzl, J. Kaczmarek and K. Kornatowski) claiming in-
ternational drug dealing to be the need for surveillance, while, in fact, the
people in question were in no way involved in this sort of criminal
offence.
It is also worth noticing how permission requests for surveillance are
created. Police use templates – a consequence of using text editors – and
officers store them on a data storage device. Elements of the request, such
as the justification for the request, ineptitude or uselessness of other means
or the legal precepts are already entered on the template. Often, in their re-
quests, officials representing Central Bureau of Investigation, State Pro-
tection Office, Intelligence Agency, and Central Anti-Corruption Bureau
cite ‘urgency’ (police officers invoke Article 19 Paragraph 3 of the Police
Force Act).
There are some deadline regulations within the Penal Code on wiretap-
ping, under which wiretaps in the so-called operational mode are meant to
gather information about people and matters for no longer than five days.
Those regulations limit excessive checks on citizens and are intended to
vet the institutions which resort to wiretaps. However, it needs to be noted
that officers competent to use wiretaps are quite open about how to cir-
cumvent those time limitations. Therefore, it gives rise to the situation in
which a citizen’s data can be gathered without a warrant. Such a warrant is
indispensable when telephone tapping in an operational procedure is ex-
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7 Ibidem.
pected to last longer than five days. Should the warrant not be issued, all
materials which cannot be used in the trial process must be destroyed. This
leads to the possibility of use and abuse of these materials in other cases
without quoting its source.
On some occasions insufficient supervision by a superior (e.g. due to
frequent job rotation) has led to a situation in which procedures on dead-
line for requesting the warrant were not duly followed. As a result, officers
enjoyed access to materials obtained during surveillance without abiding
by the Protection of Classified Information Act. Information acquired in
that way was used in other operations, and its real source was not always
revealed.
Under the existing legislation surveillance should last no longer than
three months (Article 19 Paragraph 8 of the Police Force Act), however, in
justified cases the deadline can be extended by another three months – if
and when the grounds are still valid. Moreover, Article 19 Paragraph 9 of
the Police Force Act prescribes that the Chief Prosecutor may order sur-
veillance for a definite duration even after the deadline indicated in Article
19 Paragraph 8 (in justified cases) [10].8
It needs to be stated that surveillance of suspects in Poland is abused in
the course of operations. This means that the provisions of Article 19 Para-
graph 13 of the Police Force Act are being consciously breached. What
points towards this abuse is the rare application of Article 19 Paragraph 15
of the same act [10]. As a result, evidence gathered in the course of sur-
veillance is only used in a few cases to institute criminal proceedings, or is
of negligible importance for those proceedings.
Furthermore, cases where evidence is obtained in the course of sur-
veillance are most likely not to observe Article 19 Paragraph 17 of the
Police Force Act – so there are lengthy surveillance and delays in de-
stroying the materials obtained thereby. Shortcomings in police perfor-
mance in this area should be attributed mainly to a lack of supervision by




8 Another problematic issue is the fact that the police invoke ‘new circumstances’
believed to be vital in preventing and detecting crime or in identifying perpetrators or
obtaining evidence – in accordance with Article 19 paragraph 8 and 9 of the Police
Force Act enacted on 6.04.1990 (2007 Journal of Laws No. 43, item 277 with amend-
ments).
5. Conclusions
The analysis presented should be followed by conclusions on surveil-
lance and data retention in Poland. What immediately attracts attention are
the numerous institutions vested with wide-ranging powers as regards
checking and recording conversations or, in general, access to information
and communications data. The tendency has not changed; additionally, in
2013 some legislative amendments were drafted in order to give further
powers to the Military Police as a secret service. One cannot help but get
the impression that the authorities are attempting to compensate for the
inefficiency of individual authorities (police and separate secret services)
by conferring various powers on them. This gives rise to ever-growing,
highly powerful institutions, a trend which is reflected in the debate on
the need to create a ‘rubbish police’ as a tool to meet the provisions of
the Maintenance of Cleanliness in Communes Act passed in Poland in
2013.
Separate secret services and the police face particular problems using
technical devices for surveillance. The main problems connected with le-
gal regulations and the services’ work encompass: (1) a lack of pre-
cisely-defined devices that the services may use; (2) no precisely-defined
targeted information and evidence; (3) a non-exhaustive list of informa-
tion and evidence that can be covertly obtained through operations. More-
over, since the Telecommunications Act allows for some data to be
disclosed, a long list of that data made available to specific authorities can-
not be overlooked. The data can be easily requested because the principle
of subsidiarity is not in existence. Another risk concerns obtaining data
without defining a targeted group, which may lead to violating profes-
sional privileges.
The in-depth interviews with a relatively limited group of former po-
lice officers in 2012 and 2013 form the basis for an analysis which con-
cludes that telephone tapping has become common in Poland due to (1) the
lower quality of operational and investigative work; (2) bad methods of
supervision over application of individual operational techniques;
(3) poorly trained officials in recruiting informants; (4) the abuse of exist-
ing regulations (also the provisions of the Telecommunications Act);
(5) the abuse of justification of control requests (officials often cite the
need to prevent and detect organised crimes).
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Ïðåäìåòîì àíàëèçà â ñòàòüå ÿâëÿåòñÿ ïðîáëåìàòèêà îïåðàöèîííîãî êîíòðîëÿ
è ðåòåíöèè äàííûõ â Ïîëüøå. Àíàëèç ýòîé ïðîáëåìàòèêè âûòåêàåò èç êðè-
òè÷åñêîãî îòíîøåíèÿ íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûõ îðãàíèçàöèé è ãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ
ó÷ðåæäåíèé â ñôåðå èñïîëüçîâàíèÿ îïåðàòèâíîãî êîíòðîëÿ ïîëüñêîé ïîëèöèè
è ñïåöñëóæá, â ÷àñòíîñòè ýòî êàñàåòñÿ ñôåðû ïðèìåíåíèÿ “âûïèñîê ñî ñ÷åòîâ”
è òàê íàçûâàåìûõ “ïðîñëóøåê”.
Â òåêñòå, êðîìå àíàëèçà êîëè÷åñòâåííîãî êîíòðîëÿ îïåðàöèîííûõ äàííûõ
è äàííûõ èç ñôåðû ðåòåíöèè, ïðåäñòàâëåíû âûâîäû îìáóäñìåíà, íàïðàâëåííûå
â Êîíñòèòóöèîííûé Ñóä â 2011 ã.
Ñëåäóåò óêàçàòü, ÷òî ãëàâíûå ïðîáëåìû, ñâÿçàííûå ñ ïðèìåíåíèåì îïåðà-
öèîííîãî êîíòðîëÿ è ðåòåíöèåé äàííûõ âûòåêàþò èç: (1) îòñóòñòâèÿ îïðåäå-
ëåíèÿ òåõíè÷åñêèõ ñðåäñòâ, êîòîðûìè ìîãóò ïîëüçîâàòüñÿ îòäåëüíûå ñëóæáû,
(2) îòñóòñòâèå îïðåäåëåíèÿ òîãî î êàêîé èíôîðìàöèè è äîêàçàòåëüñòâàõ èäåò
ðå÷ü, (3) îòêðûòîãî êàòàëîãà èíôîðìàöèè è äîêàçàòåëüñòâ, êîòîðûå ìîãóò
áûòü ñêðûòî ïîëó÷åíû â îïåðàòèâíîì ðåæèìå. Êðîìå òîãî, â ñâÿçè ñ ïðåäîñòà-
âëåíèåì äàííûõ ñâÿçè è òåëåêîììóíèêàöèè íà îñíîâàíèè Çàêîíà î òåëåêîììó-
íèêàöèÿõ, ñëåäóåò îáðàòèòü âíèìàíèå íà øèðîêèé ñïåêòð äàííûõ, äîñòóïíûõ
îïðåäåëåííûì ñëóæáàì.
Â òåêñòå èñïîëüçîâàíû òàêæå òàê íàçûâàåìûå “îòêðûòûå èíòåðâüþ”,
ïðîâåäåííûå ãëàâíûì îáðàçîì ñ áûâøèìè ñîòðóäíèêàìè ïîëèöèè, ñ öåëüþ
ïîêàçàòü íåôîðìàëüíûå ïðè÷èíû èñïîëüçîâàíèÿ “ïðîñëóøåê” â Ïîëüøå – ÷òî
áûëî ïðåäñòàâëåíî â ôîðìå êðàòêîãî ñîäåðæàíèÿ.
Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: îïåðàöèîííûé êîíòðîëü, çàùèòà äàííûõ, äàííûå ñâÿçè
è òåëåêîììóíèêàöèè, ïîëèöèÿ, ñåêðåòíûå ñëóæáû, ïðîñëóøèâàíèå òåëåôîíîâ,
ãðàæäàíñêèå ñâîáîäû
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